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Talking Foreign Policy:  
A Roundtable on Piracy1 
Broadcast quarterly, “Talking Foreign Policy” is a 
one-hour radio program, hosted by Case Western Reserve 
University Law Professor Michael Scharf, in which experts 
discuss the salient foreign policy issues of the day. The 
September 6, 2013 broadcast addresses the persistent problem of 
modern-day maritime piracy.  
In a recent interview, Professor Scharf said: “We want to 
cover the most salient and interesting foreign policy topics in 
each program.”2 Because international policy issues are so 
prominent in a day-to-day news cycle but often can be difficult 
to grasp, Professor Scharf pitched the idea for “Talking Foreign 
Policy” to WCPN 90.3 ideastream, Cleveland’s NPR affiliate, 
late last year. He then lined up a few colleagues known for their 
ability to discuss complex foreign policy topics in an 
easy-to-digest manner. Sort of a radio version of the 
McLaughlin Group, each episode features a regular cast of 
participants, with Professor Scharf serving as host. This 
broadcast featured: 
 The human rights expert: Roméo Dallaire, 
Retired U.N. Force Commander based in Rwanda 
during the Rwandan Genocide. Lt. Gen. Dallaire 
has since written two best-selling books and has 
been elected as a Canadian Senator. He currently 
works with many different human rights 
campaigns focused on ending the global problem 
of child soldiers. 
 The Judge: Rosemelle Mutoka, Kenyan judge who 
has presided over seven piracy cases based in 
Kenyan courts. 
 The international law professor: Milena Sterio, 
law professor at Cleveland State University; and 
 The Prosecutor: Sulakshna Beekarry, 
Head Prosecutor for the Mauritius trials on 
international piracy.  
 
1. Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows 
Aaron Kearny and Nathan Nasrallah.  
2. School of Law Professor’s Radio Show Gets Green Light: Set to Air 
March 1, THE DAILY (Feb. 27, 2012), http://thedaily.case.edu/news/ 
?p=5769. 
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Archived broadcasts (both in audio and video format) of 
“Talking Foreign Policy” are available at: law.ecae.edu/ 
TalkingForeignPolicy. The edited transcript of the September 6, 
2013 broadcast appears below.  
Talking Foreign Policy:  
Maritime Piracy – September 6, 2013 Broadcast 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy, I am your 
host Michael Scharf, Associate Dean of Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. In today’s broadcast we’ll be discussing the 
persistent problem of maritime piracy. We’ll begin our discussion with 
General Roméo Dallaire, the U.N. Force Commander who tried to 
save the Tutsis during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Nick Nolte 
played him in the award-winning 2005 film Hotel Rwanda. Since then 
General Dallaire has been appointed as a Canadian senator, written 
two best-selling books and is the founder of the Roméo Dallaire Child 
Soldier Initiative3 at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia. Thanks for 
being with us General. 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Thank you. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: I would like to start off by asking you to tell us a 
little about your journey from U.N. Force Commander to human 
rights advocate, focusing on child soldiers. 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: It was very much based on the experience in 
Rwanda. Previous to that, I was a NATO commander, so we were 
essentially engaged in classic warfare at the end of the Cold War. All 
these new imploding nations and failing states got us involved in a 
number of countries. The Rwandan mission that I commanded, which 
ultimately ended with the genocide in Rwanda, brought me face to 
face with the ability of human beings to be able to destroy each other 
on massive scales and with near impunity. Also, the use of youths and 
children, using youth militias to conduct a lot of this destruction and 
those traumas of 1994. I was able to then nurture this feeling that 
there had to be something better in the world than simply letting 
these catastrophic failures happen, and so I got engaged in trying to 
get back into the field and trying to prevent some of it from 
happening. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now you have written two best-selling books. The 
first one was Shake Hands with the Devil4 and it’s a powerful  
3. To learn more about General Dallaire’s Child Soldiers Initiative, see 
http://www.childsoldiers.org. 
4. ROMÉO DALLAIRE WITH BRENT BEARDSLEY, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE 
DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2003). 
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indictment of the international community’s inaction in the face of 
genocide in Africa. Do you think the world has learned the lessons 
from Rwanda now that it is twenty years later? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: It is interesting the way you put it, in a 
professorial way, “they learned a lesson.” I think they learned to 
create some tools that would prevent that from happening. As an 
example, and I think the dominant example, is the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine that was finally approved in 2005 in the General 
Assembly,5 which essentially the world signed up to. (It) states that if 
a nation is massively abusing the human rights of its own people or 
can’t stop it, we, and all the other nations under the U.N., must go in 
and intervene to protect. So that was an extraordinary product that 
was brought about. The problem, however, with that is that although 
they have learned that and they know it’s there, they are not 
applying it. They are not operationalizing it.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, for example, with respect to Syria, Obama has 
been saying we have to take action for humanitarian reasons. And 
other countries, and members of our Congress here in the United 
States, are saying it’s not legal to do so and we have no obligation.6 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Well, both are wrong. In fact it starts as far back 
as Libya as we went in sort of half-cocked sending in air forces, where, 
in fact Gaddafi said, “I am going to crush these cockroaches.”7 Those 
were exactly the same words used by the extremists in Rwanda that 
brought about the Responsibility to Protect. And we should have put 
boots on the ground to protect the civilians and ultimately not have 
them (Libyans) bleed in trying to establish some order. Well, Syria 
offered us exactly the same situation, but we didn’t take it up. When 
I was asked two years ago, which was already six months into the 
Syrian campaign, “What do you think we should be doing?” I said, 
“We should be applying Responsibility to Protect, but there haven’t 
been enough people killed to actually provide the politicians in this 
world who have the ability to intervene to want to intervene.” So the 
will to intervene is not behind the Responsibility to Protect. 
 
5. Responsibility to Protect, G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 
(Sept. 14, 2009). 
6. See Paul Campos, Striking Syria Is Completely Illegal, TIME (Sept. 5, 
2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/09/05/obamas-plan-for-intervention-
in-syria-is-illegal/ (explaining that the U.N. Charter only allows states 
to attack other states if there is a Security Council resolution, or if the 
attacking state is acting in self-defense). 
7. See Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit, BBC (Feb. 22, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, in Rwanda we were talking about 800,0008 
slaughtered in four months. In Syria, the recent estimates were 
1,400 people were killed by recent chemical weapons attack, but 
maybe 100,000 people have been killed since the fighting began in 
March of 2011.9 How many do you think would be enough before the 
scales tip in favor of some sort of humanitarian intervention? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: You are hitting the heart of the problem. How 
many humans have got to suffer for those who have the capability of 
responding, and considering those humans equal to them, to be worth 
us taking those risks and going in and helping them? And we haven’t 
broken that code. We’ve found means of maybe how we should do it, 
but we haven’t found the willingness of our leaders. Our politicians 
who are risk advisers are not statesmen who are prepared to take risks 
to demonstrate responsibility, demonstrate a lot of willingness to 
move to a higher plane than self-interest. Those statesmen aren’t 
there, and that’s why we are into number crunching. And to be quite 
honest, the recent gas attacks and chemical attacks are a crime 
against humanity. So fine, bring in the International Criminal Court, 
but that is not the red line in reality if we are responsible towards the 
Responsibility to Protect. The red line was two years ago and we 
didn’t intervene. Now it’s nearly impossible unless you get a ceasefire 
and move in a separation force under the U.N. to permit then a future 
negotiation stage. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let’s now talk a little bit about child soldiers, 
because that’s what you have been working on lately. Your recent 
best-seller They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children10 is about 
the problem of child soldiers and you make the case that the 
international community is ignoring that problem at its own peril. 
Can you elaborate on that? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: It’s very much peer focused. Many of the nations 
that are seeing the use of child soldiers, either by government forces 
or non-state actors, are countries where the demographics are such 
that 50 percent, sometimes more, of the population are under the age 
 
8. Roland Adjovi & Nandor Knust, Rwanda, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INT’L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/ 
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1343?rskey=m769fW&result=2&pr 
d=EPIL (last updated Sept. 2010). 
9. Josh Levs, Syria ‘Red Line’ Debate: Are Chemical Weapons in Syria 
Worse Than Conventional Attacks?, CNN (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-chemical-weapons-
red-line/index.html. 
10. ROMÉO DALLAIRE WITH JESSICA DEE HUMPHREYS, THEY FIGHT LIKE 
SOLDIERS, THEY DIE LIKE CHILDREN: THE GLOBAL QUEST TO ERADICATE 
THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS (2010). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Talking Foreign Policy: A Roundtable on Piracy 
415 
of eighteen, which is the age under the Optional Protocol on Child 
Rights where children are not to be recruited nor used in operations 
and conflict.11 So you’ve got this massive reserve of youth that is 
being abused, and they are seeing each other so used and it can sort 
of perpetuate itself because, you know, “I went through it so maybe 
this is the way we can do it and let’s keep it going.” So the greatest 
risk of the child soldiers is the fact that it can be an instrument of 
war, a weapon of war, that can sustain itself time after time, because 
the demographics are permitting it to happen.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Yes, and you have gone from looking at child 
soldiers to now focusing on an even more narrow problem, that of 
child pirates, maritime pirates. So your recent editorial in the Toronto 
Globe and Mail was headlined Child Pirates are Everybody’s 
Problem.12 Can you tell us why we should be concerned about child 
piracy?  
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Because the impact of them is of course an 
economic one that is directly related to our self-interests, our 
economic self-interests, but also the child piracy has this funny way, 
in my perspective, of going beyond its borders. This is not a 
border-restricted use of children like, let’s say, child soldiers which 
would be in a nation, a conflict zone, and apart from the LRA who 
have been sort of very mobile . . .  
MICHAEL SCHARF: That’s the Lord’s Resistance Army, which operates 
in northern Uganda and Sudan. 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Yes, and they are now in the Central African 
Republic and are being supported by Sudan to subvert South Sudan.13 
So it gets pretty complicated, but apart from that particular group, 
the others are very localized. So the question is, with pirates it 
spreads. We are seeing Western Africa now also seeing a surge in the 
use of piracy and the availability again of youths who can be given 
empowerment by weapons and indoctrination. 
 
11. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict arts. 1, 2, opened for 
signature May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 236 (entered into force Feb. 12, 
2002). 
12. Roméo Dallaire et al., Child Pirates Are Everybody’s Problem, THE 
GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
commentary/child-pirates-are-everybodys-problem/article544972/. 
13. THE RESOLVE LRA CRISIS INITIATIVE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: SUDAN’S 
HARBORING OF THE LRA IN THE KAFIA KINGI ENCLAVE, 2009-2013, at 4–
5 (2013).  
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MICHAEL SCHARF: So what percentage of pirates are children, would 
you say? Is it around 50 percent? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Well, the figures seem to be about a third or so, 
but imagine when they are on the seas and you got people on big 
ships, naval ships or other ships, and they are opening fire against the 
pirates. Are they able to discern whether or not this is an adult or a 
youth? What we are seeing are a lot of these kids being killed. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: When they do discern who is a child and who is an 
adult, many of the countries have a policy that is sort of like the local 
fishing policy, when you catch a fish that’s too small you have to send 
it back, so they call it “catch and release.” Do you think that is the 
right way to be treating the juvenile pirates? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Absolutely not! In fact, the link that brought us in 
to child piracy comes from child soldiers, which is what is happening 
on the ground before they’re actually deployed. If on the ground you 
have an atmosphere that permits this to happen, you have 
recruitment and re-recruitment, of course they are going to go to sea, 
and you have a problem. So how do we curtail it on the ground? I am 
a strong advocate for a non-punitive juvenile type of court process in 
which the youth that are taken, they are not incarcerated, (but) they 
are held. In the process of this non-punitive juvenile court, they are 
given the opportunity of being rehabilitated and reintegrated and 
ultimately are able to be extracted from that cycle of, if not banditry 
and piracy, maybe even conflict and fighting if conflict erupts.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about the adults? What can be done to 
discourage them from recruiting the children? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Take every one of them, throw them in jail, and 
throw away the key!  
MICHAEL SCHARF: So in fact, what we’re hearing is that some courts 
around the world are increasing the penalty when an adult pirate is 
found on a ship with children. They’re treating that as an aggravating 
factor. And that can send a signal that might have a deterrent effect. 
It is time for a short break. When we return we will bring three of 
the world’s leading experts on piracy into the conversation, stay with 
us.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to talking foreign policy, brought to 
you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 ideastream. 
I’m Michael Scharf, and I am joined in studio by General Roméo 
Dallaire, Judge Rosemelle Mutoka of Kenya, piracy prosecutor 
Sulakshna Beekarry of Mauritius and professor Milena Sterio of the 
Cleveland Marshall College of Law. We are talking about the problem 
of child pirates. Let me begin with Sulakshna Beekarry. To prepare 
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for your first piracy cases in Mauritius, I understand that your 
government studied the best international practices and adopted a 
state-of-the-art approach. Walk us through what that means. What 
does your government do when an accused pirate appears to be a 
juvenile? 
SULAKSHNA BEEKARRY: I have to say, we have not faced that issue in 
practice yet, but it is an issue which is expected, and guidelines have 
been discussed, a draft put up, but not yet finalized with other states 
of the region, in particular the Seychelles. Now, these guidelines would 
include what to do in that situation and how to determine an age, 
going from teeth examination and a lot of other medical ways of 
attaining the real age. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: That’s because everybody they catch, knowing 
that there’s often a catch and release policy, will say, “I may have a 
beard and a low voice but I am only fourteen,” right?  
SULAKSHNA BEEKARRY: And how do you know who is speaking the 
truth and who isn’t? But I feel as well that the decision might come 
much earlier. It might come on a decision to accept that at transfer or 
not where juveniles are involved, but this remains to be seen in the 
future.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Judge Rosemelle Mutoka, you spent 2011 in the 
United States as a distinguished jurist in residence at Case Western 
Reserve, and we are glad to have you back in Cleveland. You have 
presided over seven piracy cases in Kenya. Were any of those juvenile 
cases? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: Thank you, Michael. Yes, I have presided over 
seven cases. I have concluded three that had no juveniles. But at least 
two of them had juveniles. Before my court, it is not very common for 
the pirate defendants to claim that they are juveniles. In fact, they 
avoid saying that, and you perhaps just want to look at them, and 
because of their size and the way they appear, you perhaps think you 
should take them for age assessment, because they will not tell you; 
that was not my experience.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now that is very interesting, so where I thought 
everybody would want to claim to be a juvenile either because they 
are fearful of the pirates that hired them or for other reasons, they are 
all claiming to be adults when you suspect they are actually under 
age? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: It is an interesting phenomenon, and the 
reason for it became evident later in the process. When they came in, 
we had the challenge of communication because they speak Somali 
and they can’t communicate in the language of our court, English. 
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What became evident to us later was the fact that they did not want 
to be separated from each other. They knew that if they were 
classified as juveniles, then they would be taken to a juvenile facility. 
That meant they would be kept away from their comrades, which 
they did not want. So they would not admit they were juveniles.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, from our conversations I know that you had 
all sorts of special care for these convicted pirates. You sent them to 
special prisons, not as part of the regular population. You helped 
educate them so that if they were illiterate they could learn to read 
and write. What was your thinking on that? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: It is because we had juveniles among the 
convicted pirates, and we wanted to make sure that the juveniles in 
particular were protected and received special care. It was easier to 
group them all together in a special facility because of the issue of 
language. If you had them together in one place it was easier to 
arrange for an interpreter to be with them and to be able to 
communicate with, not only just among themselves and the prison 
authorities, but also when they had people visiting, because there was 
a lot of interest in these cases and we had a lot of people coming from 
all over the world.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: How long were the sentences usually? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: The first case we had, the first case registered 
in Kenya, was 2007. The first conviction was in 2009 and each one of 
them was sentenced to serve twenty years imprisonment, and 
immediately they appealed. Subsequently they received sentences 
between five and seven years, and right now that seems to be the 
trend. There is one case from about two years ago where the sentence 
was to serve twenty years, and the only reason is because people died 
as a consequence of their acts of piracy. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So there were murders? They were convicted of 
murder? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: No, not murder. They were charged with 
piracy, not murder, but people were killed during the attack. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: When these pirates are in the Kenyan jails as part 
of rehabilitation, you do educate them, you teach them to read and 
write, is that part of it? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: Yes, that is part of it. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So let me ask this—it’s been said that short 
sentences and decent jails, three square meals with educational 
opportunities, is not much of a deterrent for people facing famine in 
their own country. Some have even compared the treatment of the 
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Somali pirates in Kenya, in the Seychelles, and in other countries, as 
similar to going to university.14 Is that a fair criticism? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: Well, I do not agree with that. I think that is a 
very simplistic approach to what has been done. Actually, when you 
think about the fact that in Somalia there is a complete breakdown in 
law and order and most of these young men that are used to 
committing piracy offenses are not educated, so they look for 
something to do. If you take out (these men), it doesn’t matter how 
many you take out because there are still others available. So it’s not 
so much the fact that you think you are going to pass a message to 
people who really don’t care. They are looking for a livelihood, so for 
them that is collateral damage, you move on, so I think that 
argument is simplistic when you look at what’s happening in Somalia. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So prosecution is not really going to deter anybody 
no matter what the penalty? In the U.S. they have given some life 
sentences,15 for example, and the prosecutors in their closing 
arguments said, “We need to give them the most serious penalty.” In 
fact, they were asking for the death sentence in order to send a signal 
back in Somalia that piracy won’t pay. What I hear you saying is 
they are not listening in Somalia. It doesn’t matter what signals the 
prosecution is sending in foreign courts. That’s not being heard by the 
populations that are resorting to piracy. 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: I am not saying that it’s not effective; I do 
believe, of course, that it may be a deterrent, but I don’t think it’s a 
deterrent to the extent that you say, “If you give long sentences of 
course that would stop them.” Because these are desperate young 
people who are looking for a livelihood, so my argument and my 
experience is that they are contrite about the things that have 
happened. If you talk to them one on one, they will tell you that, and 
most of them who have been sentenced by Kenyan courts have tried 
to get something else to do because of course now, after educating 
them and talking to them, they feel that there’s something else they 
can do with their lives. Somali’s are enterprising people; they are very 
hardworking people. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Do they obtain employment in Kenya or do you 
send them back to Somalia after they have served their sentence?  
 
14. See Jessica Hatcher, Somali Pirates Find Life in Kenyan Jail More 
Comfortable Than on Ocean Waves, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/somali-pirates-kenya-
jail-indian-ocean. 
15. See, e.g., Brock Vergakis, Jury Recommends Life Sentences for Somali 
Pirates, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2013/08/02/somali-pirates-jury-life-sentences/2613527. 
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ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: They are usually sent back to Somalia, but you 
know, Kenya has a unique situation where we have Somali-Somalis 
and we have Kenyan-Somalis, and of course the only difference 
between them is the border. They speak the same language. So, where 
as we make orders for repatriation, and they are sent back, but you 
know the systems we have in place do not ensure that they go back, 
and they stay back, in place in Somalia.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let’s bring Professor Milena Sterio into the 
conversation. Milena, before the break General Dallaire gave us his 
prescription for solving the problem of child piracy, and we just heard 
Judge Mutoka’s discussion of how Kenya dealt with child and 
youthful pirates. What would you add to that, and do you agree with 
the approach that they are enumerating? 
MILENA STERIO: Yes, I do agree with the approaches, and it would be 
great if either one of us could say or do something that would, in the 
short term, solve the problem of child piracy. That is not the case, 
unfortunately, but we can certainly offer best practices or 
recommendations. So I think the proper approach is definitely trying 
to ascertain the suspected pirate’s age from an early stage so that 
they can be appropriately treated, separated from the adult 
population, and provided with those educational opportunities. When 
it comes to the prosecution and then the sentencing, the age of the 
suspected defendants should definitely be taken into account. Then 
once we are talking about sending them to an appropriate correctional 
facility to serve their sentences, they should definitely be sent to a 
facility for juveniles where those educational rehabilitation 
opportunities are present. It might be easier said than done but . . .  
MICHAEL SCHARF: How do we know what the line is between a 
juvenile and an adult? Are we talking about eighteen years of age? 
MILENA STERIO: So there is really no consensus in the international 
community as to the appropriate age of minimal criminal 
responsibility. There is a United Nations convention called the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child16 that defines a juvenile as 
anybody who is under eighteen, so under that convention the age 
would be eighteen. However, when it comes to the prosecution 
treatment of suspected juveniles, it’s often up to each country and the 
domestic juvenile system to determine where we set that minimum 
age of criminal responsibility. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Where do we set that in the United States?  
 
16. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, opened for signature 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). 
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MILENA STERIO: In the United States it really depends from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The minimum could be as early as seven 
or eight. In some jurisdictions the prosecutor will have the discretion 
to charge somebody as an adult or not. But certainly in the United 
States when somebody is fifteen or sixteen, many times when it comes 
to violent crimes, we treat them as adults. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, in particular, those people who are older 
teenagers, sixteen, seventeen and a half, they are, under the current 
approach, being treated as juveniles. And the current approach seems 
to be very black and white, very rigid. Are you advocating a looser 
approach where you look at facts and circumstances like they would 
do in the United States?  
MILENA STERIO: If you adopt an approach that says that you should 
take the person’s age into account, into consideration, that gives you 
the flexibility to then say, “If you are thirteen we’ll give you a lighter 
sentence. If you’re seventeen, which is much closer to eighteen, 
however arbitrary that age might be, we might give you a slightly 
harsher sentence.” 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Ok, now looking at the other side trying to not 
deter the child pirates but deter the people that are recruiting and 
using them, I wonder if we can go back to General Dallaire and focus 
on what they do to deter use of child soldiers. Recently, the ICC, 
International Criminal Court, prosecuted a military commander for 
the recruitment of child soldiers as a crime against humanity, is that 
right? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: That’s right, but it was a long, long, glacial 
exercise to get that first conviction. But it’s also been very difficult to 
get the court to fully grasp the impact of these children when they are 
recruited in order to establish the right level of punishment to be 
given to the adults. One of the reasons it’s difficult to establish that is 
that when you are bringing these children in as witnesses or they’re 
young, nineteen, twenty, and the Court is in The Hague, there’s a 
whole exercise of that, but the defense is also very, very powerful. The 
defense lawyers are just taking the witnesses apart because of what 
they’ve gone through. The girls especially—they’ve been raped, 
they’ve been abused, they have a child or two, they are probably even 
sick with AIDS. The defense tactics are destroying the witnesses’ 
ability to provide the court with a sustained logical explanation of 
what has happened to them. In the recent case before the 
International Criminal Court that resulted in the prosecution having 
to withdraw the charge of rape. Where we know the individual was 
engaged in rape on a series of occasions but they just could not get 
the witnesses to talk about it in court. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: The case you are talking about is the Lubanga 
case.17 They did end up convicting Lubanga of recruiting child 
soldiers . . . 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Well, he only got fourteen years, while the guy has 
been using all kinds of children and he’s been slaughtering and killing 
and using them as we were using World War I soldiers, you know, in 
frontal assaults and having them be blown away. He’s been throwing 
kids back into the bush when they are injured, when they are sick. I 
mean the scale of what this individual has done is off any of our 
scales. But he ends up with only a fourteen-year sentence. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So you’re saying that that case did not send the 
signal you wished it had? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: It’s not strong enough yet; it’s a start, because we 
finally got it there, but the handling, how we can handle this, is not 
resolved. How can we protect the witnesses so that they are going to 
be credible in front of the court to be able to bring the right sentence? 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, when countries in the area like Mauritius, 
Kenya, and the Seychelles are prosecuting the pirates that the United 
States and the European Union are apprehending, they often are 
prosecuted not just under the crime of piracy as defined in the 
U.N. Law of the Sea Convention,18 but sometimes under other 
terrorism conventions, for things like hostage taking and hijack of a 
ship. Do you think they should also prosecute the pirates for crimes 
against humanity using the precedent of the International Criminal 
Court’s conviction of Lubanga? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: This is a great opening to the maturing of the 
whole international judicial system. Can crimes against humanity be 
prosecuted in domestic courts? I say, absolutely. In Canada, we 
recently prosecuted a genocidier from Rwanda, though we did so for 
multiple murders because we did not have a statute criminalizing 
crimes against humanity.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let us go back to our prosecutor from Mauritius, 
Reshma Beekarry. Would your country be able to prosecute crimes 
against humanity? Do you have that crime on your books? 
 
17. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 896, 913, 1351 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
18. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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RESHMA BEEKARRY: Interestingly, our thinking has gone in that 
direction, but with a slight variation. Two years ago, we reached an 
agreement with the ICC. The ICC will be coming to sit in Mauritius 
and to have those crimes prosecuted in our local courts. We actually 
enacted a piece of legislation called the International Criminal Court 
Act 2011 in Mauritius. And for us, that is a novel idea. We have not 
quite reached the kind of thinking you are mentioning, Professor 
Scharf. We could give it thought; but it could take quite a bit of 
thought.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: So there is the possibility that if Mauritius finds 
itself with a major recruiter of child pirates, you could prosecute that 
person not just for piracy, but maybe for the crime against humanity 
of recruiting child pirates like the ICC has done for recruiting child 
soldiers? 
RESHMA BEEKARRY: Possibly. I would think the seed for that has 
already been sown. We have already opened the door for the ICC to 
come and sit and for us to start looking towards bigger crimes. Until 
now, these crimes have only been prosecuted in The Hague.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, there is one little wrinkle here. Piracy is 
normally, as I understand it, a crime committed in international 
waters, on the high seas. But where is the recruitment being 
committed? That is on dry land. I will turn this to our professor from 
Cleveland State, Milena Sterio. Is there any recent precedent for 
prosecuting dry land piracy? 
MILENA STERIO: Yes. We actually have very interesting, important 
recent precedents on that in the United States courts. There have 
been two cases—one called Ali19 and the other one called Shibin20—
where the defendants were essentially prosecuted for aiding and 
abetting piracy (facilitating piracy) for acts that they committed from 
dry land. They were prosecuted under the United States Piracy 
Statute.21 One of them was convicted and received a life sentence; and 
the other one’s proceedings are still ongoing. In both instances, the 
United States courts have accepted this notion that you can commit 
acts of facilitation on dry land and be prosecuted as a pirate.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Tell us about this Ali case. What was he actually 
doing? 
 
19. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 933–34 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
20. United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming the 
fifteen-count conviction of Mohammad Saaili Shibin for his involvement 
in two piracies by acting, inter alia, as ransom negotiator). 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). 
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MILENA STERIO: Ali was essentially a hostage negotiator. After there 
were hostages taken by Somali pirates, he had facilitated the 
negotiation of the ransom. He, I think, had stepped foot onboard the 
vessel; but the vessel, at that point, was in the Somali territorial 
waters. So Ali, the defendant himself, had never acted on the high 
seas. He had committed other acts of negotiating the ransom from 
Somalia (dry land).22 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Wasn’t his defense that he was actually trying to 
facilitate the rescue and the release of the victims? 
MILENA STERIO: Yes. He basically claimed that he was a good guy, 
since he was trying to help the release of the hostages. Of course, 
United States prosecutors did not buy that argument and prosecuted 
him as a piracy facilitator, instead of a hero.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: What is the difference between that case and the 
situation of insurance companies? If you are insured by a company 
like Lloyds of London, your vessel is hijacked, and the pirates say, 
“We want a million dollars for the release of your vessel and its 
crew;” Lloyds of London sends in a hostage negotiator, who handles 
everything. Then, they pay it off and maybe jack up your insurance 
premium for the future. Everybody lives happily ever after, especially 
Lloyds of London, who is making a fortune. Why should Lloyds of 
London not be prosecuted under the Ali precedent? 
MILENA STERIO: Good question. There is a provision in the United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea that might make 
prosecution of insurance companies difficult. In the article that deals 
with aiding and abetting, it says the defendant must intentionally 
facilitate.23 So the insurance companies could make the argument that 
they are not really “intentionally” doing anything. If anything, they 
are helping after the fact. But I agree with you. It is a fine line.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Ok. And this guy Ali, I have heard that he was the 
highest-level pirate prosecuted in modern times. Is that right? 
MILENA STERIO: That is right. And by the way, the Ali case is the 
only modern piracy case based on universal jurisdiction in the United 
States courts. Ali had no nexus and no connection to the United 
 
22. See Ali, 718 F.3d at 930 (holding that the prosecution: (1) for aiding 
and abetting piracy and the extraterritorial scope of hostage taking were 
consistent with the law of nations; (2) for conspiracy to commit piracy 
was inconsistent with international law; and (3) for hostage taking did 
not violate due process). 
23. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101(c), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436. 
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States; the victims were not American, he was not American, and the 
case occurred in Somalia. So it’s really a fascinating case. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So the highest-level guy is just a negotiator. No 
kingpins, no financiers, no top people have been prosecuted?  
MILENA STERIO: Not yet. But this opens the door for those kinds of 
prosecutions, at least in the United States. Now we know that, in 
U.S. courts, if you commit acts on dry land of aiding and abetting 
piracy (facilitating piracy), and that can include financing a future 
pirate attack, you can be prosecuted for piracy. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Judge Mutoka was saying earlier that Kenya has 
only been prosecuting the foot soldier pirates that they capture, and 
she is not absolutely sure if there is a deterrent effect. I guess if these 
people are fungible and they are just the foot soldiers, this is sort of 
like trying to deal with the narcotics trade by just going after the 
so-called mules. What we learned in that area is until you start going 
up to the leaders of the cartel, you are not able to make a big 
difference. General Dallaire, what does that say about our strategy for 
combating piracy? Are we going about it all wrong by just plucking 
the foot soldiers off from the vessels and prosecuting them? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: I think that there has got to be concurrent 
activity. You can’t stop prosecuting the pirates and only focus on the 
financiers. In the case of the child soldiers and the child pirates that 
continue to be recruited, used, and later become the casualties, we 
meet judicial solutions for them as best we can. I think that you have 
to keep at that to make a responsible action in that regard. However, 
where we are failing is not pursuing action before the International 
Criminal Court, equating acts of piracy to crimes against humanity. 
But the International Criminal Court does not have its own police. If 
the pirate kingpins are in a nation that is a failing state, which does 
not have a rule of law or a basis for wanting to go after those guys, 
how do you get into a sovereign state, go after them, and haul them 
out? That is where there is a nuance that I think has not yet been 
pursued. When we introduced the Responsibility to Protect24 doctrine, 
we began to question whether the Westphalian concept of sovereignty 
was still absolute. Now, we can intervene for a good reason in certain 
cases. I would argue that piracy is affecting the international 
community. We should find a means of actually getting people to go 
after the bad guys and haul them out.  
 
24. See Adrienne Margolis, Responsibility to Protect – Turning Intervention 
into an Obligation, 62 INT’L B. NEWS 17, 20 (2008) (commenting that 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine initially assumes state sovereignty 
to the extent that the state is willing and able to protect its people; if it 
cannot, then the international community may have to intervene). 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, Judge Mutoka, you have told me that the 
bad guys (the financiers) are living pretty openly and well in Kenya. 
Can you tell us a little bit about that? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: Yes. Actually, research has shown that there is 
a lot of investment of piracy proceeds in Kenya. In fact, statistics 
show that there is about $2.1 billion that has been invested in Kenya 
and cannot be accounted for.25 Of course, then, it has something to do 
with organized crime. And piracy is an organized crime . . . 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So they are not investing it in the stock exchange; 
they are investing it in narcotics trade and such things.  
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: Exactly. Then, they invest in real estate. One 
of the effects of investing in that kind of business or venture is that 
they have to use illegal means. There is a lot of bribery in order for 
them to be able to get licenses and to do what they are doing. 
Eventually, the Kenyan economy is affected very negatively by this. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But your government does not seem to be doing a 
lot about these pirates who are living openly, driving fancy cars, and 
living in big mansions. How do you explain that? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: In fact, I think that because of a need to do 
something about it, the chief justice in my country decided that we 
are going to set up an international crimes division. He said that one 
of the main reasons we are setting it up is that the economy is 
mortally threatened by international related crimes. This division is 
going to deal with all manner of international related crimes, 
including piracy, trafficking, narcotics trade, and so on. I believe that, 
through this effort, the obligation will fall on law enforcement 
agencies to do something about these crimes, particularly money 
laundering. That is where you can be able to get a hold of this kind of 
investment in Kenya. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: We have been discussing some interesting 
approaches to try to deter the pirates: going after the financiers, the 
money launderers, and the recruiters. It is time for a short break. 
When we return, we are going to look at what needs to be done to 
prevent a resurgence of piracy when the anti-piracy naval forces have 
to depart the Indian Ocean, which is going to happen soon. Stay with 
us. We will be right back.  
 
25. Jaindi Kisero, Mystery of Sh164bn Smuggled into Kenya, DAILY NATION 
(May 20, 2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Mystery%20of% 
20Sh164bn%20smuggled%20into%20Kenya/-/1056/922780/-/5xcvlhz/-
/index.html. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: I am Michael Scharf, and we are back with 
“Talking Foreign Policy.” I am joined in studio by a former 
U.N. force commander, a judge who has presided over dozens of 
piracy trials in Kenya, the Chief of Piracy Prosecutions of the island-
country Mauritius, and an international law professor. We are talking 
about the scourge of maritime piracy. Let me go back to our 
prosecutor, Reshma Beekarry. In our final segment, let’s step back to 
discuss the big picture. Reshma, you know the prosecutors from the 
Seychelles. You know them from Kenya. You know them from several 
other countries. You have had a lot of discussions in order to get the 
best practices for your upcoming prosecutions. Do you think that the 
prosecutions all around the world are having a deterrent effect on 
piracy? 
RESHMA BEEKARRY: I understand from discussions I have had that 
views are split on this. I do not think there has been any study to 
give us a definite answer as to whether these prosecutions are having 
a deterrent effect. I think some people have been quoting naval 
operations or the use of private guards as the real reason for a 
deterrent effect, so there is an issue there. As far as I am concerned, 
my personal feeling is that they actually do. Prosecutions send out a 
very strong signal that impunity is not going to be allowed, and you 
will be made to pay for it. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: In the last segment, Professor Sterio was telling us 
about some of the recent precedents in the United States. Judge 
Mutoka, can you tell us about what you consider your most 
important piracy judgments in Kenya? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: I think it is the first one that I handled. It was 
a case where pirates hijacked a Norwegian ship, which was rescued by 
the Swedish Navy. The most interesting thing was that when the case 
came up for hearing before me, we had to have three sets of 
interpreters. We had a Somali interpreter for the Somalis; we had a 
Norwegian interpreter, who communicated with the Swedish 
interpreter. The Swedish interpreter would then take it back to the 
court interpreter, who would say it in English. That was very 
interesting. Eventually, I convicted the pirates and sentenced them to 
serve eight years imprisonment.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: How many pirates, in total, have been convicted in 
Kenya? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: To date, 115 pirates have been convicted and 
seventeen cases with seventy-seven defendants are pending. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: When those seventeen cases are over, is it correct 
that Kenya is “washing its hands” of these prosecutions and walking 
away?  
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ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: I would imagine that that is a correct 
summation. The prosecutions were based on understandings that were 
entered into between Kenya and the countries that would be affected 
by piratical attacks in the Horn of Africa. To my knowledge, we have 
not renewed any of the understandings that we had. The last case we 
had was last year. To date, they have not brought any new cases. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Was there sort of a quid pro quo? Was the United 
Nations giving money and assistance to Kenya in order to take on 
these pirate cases?  
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: I might not be able to correctly answer that, 
because I am not too sure about what went on behind the scenes. I 
only know what is on paper. I do know that there was a lot of 
assistance that was given towards improving the infrastructure. 
Technical assistance was also given to the judiciary, the President, 
and the police. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Is that money no longer flowing? Is that part of 
the calculus? 
ROSEMELLE MUTOKA: I imagine that it is still there. We do have 
interest that has been expressed in areas of training, especially the 
training of judicial officers; this means that support is still being 
provided. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let’s go back to our prosecutor from Mauritius. Is 
Mauritius receiving international donor money to try to convince 
Mauritius to take on piracy cases? 
RESHMA BEEKARRY: I am not sure I would make that link straight 
away. But the transfer agreement with the European Union came 
with an assistance package. This was fully related to the trials 
themselves, the training of prosecutors, and just having a secure 
courtroom with metal detectors, dogs, and video link facility. That is 
how far the assistance has extended.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Milena Sterio, you and I went to the Seychelles to 
assist in some piracy work, and we were told that the U.N. built a 
state of the art prison in their national park. Can you tell us about 
that? 
MILENA STERIO: It wasn’t actually a new prison, but rather a special 
prison wing, where the suspected pirates are being held. There was 
certainly assistance by one of the United Nations offices with respect 
to training the judges, the prosecutors, and the defense counsel. 
We’ve been focusing on the prosecution side, but the defense is also 
important for fair trials. I do know that the international community 
has been involved in helping. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: I am sure that it is not just the money that 
convinces countries to prosecute. For instance, both in the Seychelles 
and Mauritius, tourism is being negatively affected by the perception 
that there are pirates in your waters. Reshma, your country worries 
about that as well, right? 
RESHMA BEEKARRY: We do. It has affected the whole region in a lot 
of ways. You would not want it to continue. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: The U.S. has also been prosecuting pirates, as 
Milena Sterio told us earlier about two recent cases of dry-land 
piracy. But there was also a case that was really unusual; it is not 
your typical piracy case. It involved the Sea Shepherds.26 This is that 
vessel called the Bob Barker that you see in the T.V. series Whaling 
Wars. The vessel goes after the Japanese whaling fleets and tries to 
ram them to stop them from hunting endangered whales. What 
happened in that case, Milena? 
MILENA STERIO: The Sea Shepherds case was just recently decided in 
the Ninth Circuit here in the United States. In that case, which was 
actually a civil law suit (private tort case), the judge in the Ninth 
Circuit found that a marine organization like the Sea Shepherds can 
be considered a piratical organization, as long as they are not 
operating on behalf of a government.27 As long as they are operating 
for their own private purposes, it does not really matter that they are 
not sea robbers; they were ramming the whaling fleets to protect the 
whales.28 If they are committing violent acts on the high seas, for the 
purposes of United States law, they can be considered pirates. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Greenpeace watch out, huh?  
MILENA STERIO: [laughs] Yes, definitely.29 
MICHAEL SCHARF: We have been talking about prosecutions, and we 
have been talking about precedents. And we’ve been debating 
 
26. See Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 
708 F.3d 1099, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding “[y]ou don’t need a peg 
leg or an eye patch” to be a pirate and that the ramming of another 
ship constitutes the “violence” element of piracy.). 
27. Id. at 1102. 
28. Id.  
29. A few weeks after the broadcast, Russia arrested the crew of a 
Greenpeace vessel that had been protesting drilling in arctic waters, 
claiming that they were pirates. See Shaun Walker, Greenpeace 
Activists Charged with Piracy by Russian Authorities, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/02/ 
greenpeace-activists-charged-piracy-russian-authorities. 
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whether prosecutions deter piracy. Another deterrent is the use of 
private security guards,30 with whom companies that own private 
vessels are contracting to protect their ships. And most importantly, 
several countries have sent armed vessels to patrol the waters off the 
coast of Somalia. General Dallaire, how many vessels would you say 
are out there? It sounds to me like there is an armada of U.S. and 
European vessels.  
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: I do not have the figure, but I think you are quite 
right. It is a sizeable fleet, which includes Chinese and Russian vessels 
as well. It is a very polyglot fleet. There is a problem with using 
extreme measures (using the military) in any conflict or any situation 
with insurrections. The military takes a very definitive position, and 
the position is not one that can be sustained in the long term. It is 
not the normal course for a nation to always have its military 
deployed in a security role.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: It is quite expensive, isn’t it?  
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: It is expensive, and it is not necessarily the most 
effective tool. When we moved all those naval assets there, we 
obviously recognized that this had a sort of finite time to it. This was 
because of the nature of the fleets that could be maintained there, the 
cost, and the like. The question that never seemed to be coming to 
the floor and that people have been avoiding is, “What happens when 
they leave?” They’re going to leave. So the fear is that you leave a 
vacuum. So there have been these security companies and other 
arrangements made. I think that is where the international 
community fails. As an example, why isn’t there a U.N. naval 
capability? We have U.N. land capabilities. When I was in Cambodia 
in 1992, we had a naval capability in that mission to fight pirates off 
Kompong Som. Why doesn’t the U.N. have that? Why doesn’t it have 
its own capability versus having to seek or wait for donor countries to 
provide? 
MICHAEL SCHARF: It sounds almost like this is a surge. We can take 
an analogy from Iraq and Afghanistan and maybe go even farther 
back in history when the U.S. sent the marines against the Barbary 
pirates. In these cases, the hope was that if we have enough military 
assets there, we will finally defeat the pirates. Then, we can manage 
the situation on a lower level. But you’re saying that is not going to 
happen. When they pull out those assets, you think piracy is going to 
spike. 
 
30. See generally Michael L. Mineau, Pirates, Blackwater, and Maritime 
Security: The Rise of Private Navies in Response to Modern Piracy, 
9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 63 (2010) (discussing the use of private security 
companies against pirates). 
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ROMÉO DALLAIRE: You have not broken the back of the whole 
system.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Is it possible to do that without solving the failed 
state that is Somalia? 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: This is where I come back to the question of 
sovereignty. If a sovereign nation, by its inept capabilities as a failing 
state, is putting a whole bunch of other nations at risk, there is surely 
a means by which the International Criminal Court and international 
community can handle something like that. That is why I have 
always felt that the ad hoc international tribunals, which led to the 
International Criminal Court,31 was the first step in bringing global 
justice.32 A new dimension is needed, and I think this is a great 
opportunity to try to bring international justice to another level of 
engagement in a case where a nation-state is, in fact, putting other 
nation-states at risk by its inability to curtail what is coming out of 
it.  
MICHAEL SCHARF: Meanwhile, Somalia is like a vacuum; it is a 
lawless place. In fact, Al-Shabaab, which is a terrorist organization 
affiliated with Al-Qaeda, is on the border of Kenya. I understand that 
your government, Judge Mutoka, invaded Somalia to destroy the 
Al-Shabaab troops two years ago?  
JUDGE MUTOKA: That is true, yes. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Are your troops still there? 
JUDGE MUTOKA: They are still there. In fact, there has been a call 
from the Somali government that they should leave; but they are still 
there. The Kenyan government argues that it has to protect the 
border between Kenya and Somalia so that any cautions are not 
renewed there. You are aware that there have been a number of 
sporadic attacks, especially on churches; I’ve never understood that, 
though. The attacks have been attributed to Al-Shabaab. We feel as a 
country that Kenya has helped in bringing down piracy by ensuring 
that they do not get any routes in passage. 
 
31. See Hans-Peter Kaul, International Criminal Court (ICC), MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT’L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/ 
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e42?rskey= 
jmkqkZ&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Dec. 2010).  
32. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22 (1999) (describing 
the history, scope, and structure of the Rome Statute). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Talking Foreign Policy: A Roundtable on Piracy 
432 
MICHAEL SCHARF: I think what I’m hearing is that until Somalia has 
an effective government, a rule of law, and international justice 
helping out, the pirates are going to continue to flourish along with 
the drug traffickers and the organized criminals because that’s what 
happens in a failed state. It is not just Somalia; there is also Yemen, 
and now pirates are breaking out in some weaker states on the west 
coast of Africa. We’ve heard today that just prosecuting is not 
enough, and just providing security is not enough; there needs to be a 
more holistic approach.  
 Well, it’s time to wrap up the program. Hollywood has always 
glorified piracy. But in today’s broadcast of “Talking Foreign Policy,” 
we’ve seen that piracy is a scourge that continues to vex the 
international community. That is the version of piracy that you’re 
going to see in the new Hollywood movie with Tom Hanks, Captain 
Phillips, which should be refreshing. If you want to weigh-in on the 
discussion or suggest a topic for the upcoming broadcast of “Talking 
Foreign Policy,” please send an email to 
talkingforeignpolicy@case.edu. Let me thank our outstanding 
panelists, who have come from far and wide. Again, we have Judge 
Mutoka, who has come from Kenya; General Dallaire, who has come 
from Canada; Prosecutor Beekarry, who has come all the way from 
Mauritius; and from just down the street we have Professor Sterio, 
from Cleveland State Law School. Thank you all. I’m Michael Scharf. 
You have been listening to “Talking Foreign Policy” produced by 
Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 ideastream.  
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